Torit1955’s Weblog

Just another WordPress.com weblog

Archive for March 2009

Alex De Waal response by proxy on Darfur genocide question

leave a comment »

Alex De Waal response by proxy on Darfur genocide question
Friday 27 March 2009.

By Steve Paterno

March  26,  2009  — I wrote an article published in Sudan Tribune on March
23rd,  2009  entitled  “Alex De Waal and Darfur Genocide Question.” In the
article,  I  stated and explained that Dr. Alex De Waal, a foremost expert
and  scholar  on  Sudanese  affairs has, of recent, been dismissive of any
claim  of  genocide  committed  in  Darfur,  skeptical  of the strength of
evidence of genocide that can be presented in court, and adamantly opposed to  the  prosecutions of President Omar al-Bashir on the alleged crimes he committed  in  the ongoing conflict in Darfur. The article also points out to  De  Waal’s  relentless  attacks on the prosecutor of the International Criminal  Court (ICC) Luis Moreno-Ocampo, and it as well exposes De Waal’s drastic shift of position over a short period of time on the same subject.

In  what  seems  to  be a rather disguised reaction to my article, De Waal
made  a  very  weak  attempt  to refute some of the concerns I raised with
respect  to his position on the subject matter. His feeble effort surfaced
in  an  article  he  published, following my article, on his blog which he
later  forwarded  the  same  article  to  be  carried in Sudan Tribune the
subsequent  day with the title Genocide by force of habit? In his article,
De  Waal made endeavored to completely avoid any direct reference to me or my  article.  The closest he ever comes to making reference to me is where
<!–
D([“mb”,”\n\u0026nbsp;he \u0026nbsp;used \u0026nbsp;generic \u0026nbsp;pronounce such as “those” and “some.” Interestingly, he\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;instead \u0026nbsp;picked up on a likely target, Professor Eric Reeve who is similar\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;to him in some odd ways as his point of reference. He makes a reference of\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;Reeve’s \u0026nbsp;article written awhile ago, which pointed out that he has shifted\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;his position on the genocide question.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;De \u0026nbsp;Waal \u0026nbsp;goes \u0026nbsp;in \u0026nbsp;his \u0026nbsp;article \u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;charge that “those” pointing out his\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;drastic \u0026nbsp;shift \u0026nbsp;of \u0026nbsp;position \u0026nbsp;are “half-witted critics,” because though he\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;shifted \u0026nbsp;his \u0026nbsp;position, it is “a minor shift” that changes with facts. For\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;those \u0026nbsp;who \u0026nbsp;follow \u0026nbsp;De Waal’s shifting of position, the fear is that he is\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;trying \u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;change \u0026nbsp;the \u0026nbsp;facts as he goes other than trying to allow facts\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;change \u0026nbsp;him. According to him, some of the facts, which make him shift his\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;position \u0026nbsp;include: \u0026nbsp;lack \u0026nbsp;of \u0026nbsp;evidence \u0026nbsp;on part of Khartoum regime for its\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;intention \u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;commit genocide in Darfur; advice from lawyers who told him\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;not \u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;use \u0026nbsp;the \u0026nbsp;term genocide when referring to atrocities committed in\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;Darfur; \u0026nbsp;the dropping down of mortality rate; the reduction of violence by\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;90%; and the bringing of humanitarian crisis under control.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;Though \u0026nbsp;De \u0026nbsp;Waal \u0026nbsp;sought \u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;address my article by proxies, I was in away\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;compelled \u0026nbsp;to respond to his article by posting my comments on his blog to\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;address \u0026nbsp;some \u0026nbsp;of \u0026nbsp;the \u0026nbsp;issues that he tried to refute. To my surprise, De\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;Waal decided to block my commentaries. He then wrote me privately, issuing\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;a \u0026nbsp;condition \u0026nbsp;that before he would post my commentaries, I “must apologize\u003cbr /\u003e”,1]
);

//–> he  used  generic  pronounce such as “those” and “some.” Interestingly, he
instead  picked up on a likely target, Professor Eric Reeve who is similar
to him in some odd ways as his point of reference. He makes a reference of
Reeve’s  article written a while ago, which pointed out that he has shifted
his position on the genocide question.

De  Waal  goes  in  his  article  to  charge that “those” pointing out his
drastic  shift  of  position  are “half-witted critics,” because though he
shifted  his  position, it is “a minor shift” that changes with facts. For
those  who  follow  De Waal’s shifting of position, the fear is that he is
trying  to  change  the  facts as he goes other than trying to allow facts
change  him. According to him, some of the facts, which make him shift his
position  include:  lack  of  evidence  on part of Khartoum regime for its
intention  to  commit genocide in Darfur; advice from lawyers who told him
not  to  use  the  term genocide when referring to atrocities committed in
Darfur;  the dropping down of mortality rate; the reduction of violence by
90%; and the bringing of humanitarian crisis under control.

Though  De  Waal  sought  to  address my article by proxies, I was in a way
compelled  to respond to his article by posting my comments on his blog to
address  some  of  the  issues that he tried to refute. To my surprise, De
Waal decided to block my commentaries. He then wrote me privately, issuing a  condition  that before he would post my commentaries, I “must apologize
<!–
D([“mb”,”\n\u0026nbsp;in \u0026nbsp;public” for alleging that he (De Waal) opposes the arrest of al-Bashir\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;and for questioning his motive for having alerted al-Bashir weeks prior to\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;prosecutor \u0026nbsp;of \u0026nbsp;ICC \u0026nbsp;officially \u0026nbsp;filing \u0026nbsp;for \u0026nbsp;the \u0026nbsp;arrest \u0026nbsp;warrant against\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;al-Bashir.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;To \u0026nbsp;me, \u0026nbsp;it \u0026nbsp;was apparent that De Waal was attempting to blackmail me into\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;apologizing \u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;him, \u0026nbsp;given \u0026nbsp;that \u0026nbsp;my \u0026nbsp;article \u0026nbsp;has \u0026nbsp;clearly impacted him\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;negatively. \u0026nbsp;It also became obvious that he was in away trying to suppress\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;my \u0026nbsp;freedom \u0026nbsp;of \u0026nbsp;expression \u0026nbsp;and limit my ability to exchange ideas by not\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;only \u0026nbsp;blocking \u0026nbsp;my commentaries, but also by threatening to deny me access\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;public \u0026nbsp;platform. \u0026nbsp;It \u0026nbsp;would \u0026nbsp;only \u0026nbsp;be \u0026nbsp;fair \u0026nbsp;if \u0026nbsp;he \u0026nbsp;would \u0026nbsp;allow \u0026nbsp;my\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;commentaries \u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;be \u0026nbsp;posted \u0026nbsp;along \u0026nbsp;his \u0026nbsp;article, because his article was\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;attending \u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;my \u0026nbsp;previous article by proxy. In addition, my commentaries\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;were \u0026nbsp;relevant \u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;his \u0026nbsp;article. \u0026nbsp;But \u0026nbsp;instead, \u0026nbsp;De Waal chose the art of\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;blackmailing \u0026nbsp;and \u0026nbsp;power \u0026nbsp;of \u0026nbsp;suppression to deal away with me, though not\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;successful. So the concept of censorship is not only practiced in Khartoum\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;or by some dictators with big names. It seems to be all over.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;Anyway, \u0026nbsp;on \u0026nbsp;my \u0026nbsp;part, \u0026nbsp;I \u0026nbsp;see \u0026nbsp;no \u0026nbsp;reason \u0026nbsp;to apologize to De Waal for my\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;article. \u0026nbsp;I \u0026nbsp;don’t \u0026nbsp;think \u0026nbsp;I can also be blackmailed or succumbed into any\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;threats. \u0026nbsp;And \u0026nbsp;I \u0026nbsp;am not in any way bound to have my freedom of expression\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;restricted \u0026nbsp;and \u0026nbsp;my \u0026nbsp;ability \u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;exchange \u0026nbsp;ideas get limited by those who\u003cbr /\u003e”,1] in  public” for alleging that he (De Waal) opposes the arrest of al-Bashir
and for questioning his motive for having alerted al-Bashir weeks prior to
prosecutor  of  ICC  officially  filing  for  the  arrest  warrant against
al-Bashir.

To  me,  it  was apparent that De Waal was attempting to blackmail me into
apologizing  to  him,  given  that  my  article  has  clearly impacted him
negatively.  It also became obvious that he was in a way trying to suppress
my  freedom  of  expression  and limit my ability to exchange ideas by not
only  blocking  my commentaries, but also by threatening to deny me access to  public  platform.  It  would  only  be  fair  if  he  would  allow  my
commentaries  to  be  posted  along  his  article, because his article was
attending  to  my  previous article by proxy. In addition, my commentaries
were  relevant  to  his  article.  But  instead,  De Waal chose the art of
blackmailing  and  power  of  suppression to deal away with me, though not
successful. So the concept of censorship is not only practiced in Khartoum
or by some dictators with big names. It seems to be all over.

Anyway,  on  my  part,  I  see  no  reason  to apologize to De Waal for my
article.  I  don’t  think  I can also be blackmailed or succumbed into any
threats.  And  I  am not in any way bound to have my freedom of expression
restricted  and  my  ability  to  exchange  ideas get limited by those who
<!–
D([“mb”,”\n\u0026nbsp;falsely \u0026nbsp;think \u0026nbsp;they \u0026nbsp;have monopoly of thoughts. I have not made any false\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;allegations \u0026nbsp;against \u0026nbsp;De \u0026nbsp;Waal, \u0026nbsp;but \u0026nbsp;my \u0026nbsp;points are all supported by hard\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;facts—the \u0026nbsp;facts, which mostly originated from De Waal’s own writings. For\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;example, \u0026nbsp;on \u0026nbsp;a \u0026nbsp;notion \u0026nbsp;that De Waal opposes the arrest of President Omar\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;al-Bashir, \u0026nbsp;in \u0026nbsp;an \u0026nbsp;Op-Ed \u0026nbsp;for \u0026nbsp;Washington Post, even weeks before the ICC\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;Prosecutor \u0026nbsp;Ocampo \u0026nbsp;could \u0026nbsp;file \u0026nbsp;a \u0026nbsp;request for the arrest warrant against\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;al-Bashir, \u0026nbsp;De \u0026nbsp;Waal \u0026nbsp;warned \u0026nbsp;that \u0026nbsp;bringing \u0026nbsp;charges “against the highest\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;echelons \u0026nbsp;of \u0026nbsp;government” in Khartoum is a terrible gamble. (This was when\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;De Waal had already a tip-off on the possibility of imminent charges being\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;leveled \u0026nbsp;against al-Bashir where in turn he alerted al-Bashir of it). Ever\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;since \u0026nbsp;then, De Waal continued to argue against the arrest warrant against\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;al-Bashir. \u0026nbsp;Just \u0026nbsp;months \u0026nbsp;prior \u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;the \u0026nbsp;ICC \u0026nbsp;Pretrial Chamber making the\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;rulings \u0026nbsp;against \u0026nbsp;al-Bashir, \u0026nbsp;De \u0026nbsp;Waal \u0026nbsp;went \u0026nbsp;on \u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;critique \u0026nbsp;the public\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;application \u0026nbsp;by \u0026nbsp;the \u0026nbsp;chief \u0026nbsp;prosecutor \u0026nbsp;of \u0026nbsp;the ICC for an arrest warrant\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;against al-Bashir where De Waal recommended that there should never be any\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;charges \u0026nbsp;“brought \u0026nbsp;against \u0026nbsp;the \u0026nbsp;Sudanese \u0026nbsp;President.” He urged the United\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;Nation \u0026nbsp;Security Council to invoke article 16 for “unconditional” deferral\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;of \u0026nbsp;al-Bashir \u0026nbsp;arrest \u0026nbsp;warrant. \u0026nbsp;The \u0026nbsp;facts that De Waal is opposed to the\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;arrest \u0026nbsp;of \u0026nbsp;al-Bashir \u0026nbsp;are \u0026nbsp;very \u0026nbsp;clear \u0026nbsp;and \u0026nbsp;can be inferred from all his\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;writings, \u0026nbsp;even way before the application of arrest warrant for al-Bashir\u003cbr /\u003e”,1]
);

//–> falsely  think  they  have monopoly of thoughts. I have not made any false
allegations  against  De  Waal,  but  my  points are all supported by hard
facts—the  facts, which mostly originated from De Waal’s own writings. For
example,  on  a  notion  that De Waal opposes the arrest of President Omar
al-Bashir,  in  an  Op-Ed  for  Washington Post, even weeks before the ICC
Prosecutor  Ocampo  could  file  a  request for the arrest warrant against
al-Bashir,  De  Waal  warned  that  bringing  charges “against the highest
echelons  of  government” in Khartoum is a terrible gamble. (This was when
De Waal had already a tip-off on the possibility of imminent charges being
leveled  against al-Bashir where in turn he alerted al-Bashir of it). Ever
since  then, De Waal continued to argue against the arrest warrant against
al-Bashir.  Just  months  prior  to  the  ICC  Pretrial Chamber making the
rulings  against  al-Bashir,  De  Waal  went  on  to  critique  the public
application  by  the  chief  prosecutor  of  the ICC for an arrest warrant
against al-Bashir where De Waal recommended that there should never be any charges  “brought  against  the  Sudanese  President.” He urged the United Nation  Security Council to invoke article 16 for “unconditional” deferral of  al-Bashir  arrest  warrant.  The  facts that De Waal is opposed to the arrest  of  al-Bashir  are  very  clear  and  can be inferred from all his
writings,  even way before the application of arrest warrant for al-Bashir
<!–
D([“mb”,”\n\u0026nbsp;was \u0026nbsp;filed \u0026nbsp;as \u0026nbsp;demonstrated \u0026nbsp;in the examples above. De Waal is a featured\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;celebrity \u0026nbsp;of \u0026nbsp;pro Khartoum regime Sudan Media Center, where his arguments\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;in \u0026nbsp;opposition \u0026nbsp;of \u0026nbsp;ICC \u0026nbsp;are echoed in that platform over and over for the\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;amazement of the regime in Khartoum and its supporters.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;As \u0026nbsp;for De Waal complaints for being questioned on his motive for alerting\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;al-Bashir \u0026nbsp;prior \u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;the \u0026nbsp;ICC \u0026nbsp;prosecutor \u0026nbsp;filing the application for the\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;arrest \u0026nbsp;warrant, \u0026nbsp;it \u0026nbsp;is \u0026nbsp;up to De Waal to explain his motives and for the\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;general public to interpret or even speculate on those motives.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;Well, \u0026nbsp;the \u0026nbsp;last \u0026nbsp;time \u0026nbsp;I \u0026nbsp;checked \u0026nbsp;De \u0026nbsp;Waal’s \u0026nbsp;blog, Eric Reeve, the lone\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;respondent \u0026nbsp;whom \u0026nbsp;De Waal picked-on and allowed to comment on his article,\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;is \u0026nbsp;being \u0026nbsp;pounded \u0026nbsp;by \u0026nbsp;the \u0026nbsp;supporters \u0026nbsp;of \u0026nbsp;the regime in Khartoum. Those\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;supporters \u0026nbsp; of \u0026nbsp; the \u0026nbsp;regime \u0026nbsp;in \u0026nbsp;Khartoum \u0026nbsp;are \u0026nbsp;allowed \u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;post \u0026nbsp;their\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;commentaries \u0026nbsp;at \u0026nbsp;the expense of those who disagree with De Waal. The most\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;shocking twist of events is that De Waal had no choice, but to forward his\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;article \u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;be \u0026nbsp;published \u0026nbsp;in \u0026nbsp;Sudan Tribune as a counteraction to my own\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;article. \u0026nbsp;I hope this is not “counteraction on the cheap.” This is ironic,\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;because \u0026nbsp;De \u0026nbsp;Waal \u0026nbsp;could \u0026nbsp;privately threaten to deny me access to a public\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;platform \u0026nbsp;he controls while he would sneak around to go after me in search\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;of \u0026nbsp;another \u0026nbsp;public platform that I thrive on. After all, De Waal does not\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;control \u0026nbsp;public \u0026nbsp;platform at least that is what he found out. Now with his\u003cbr /\u003e”,1]
);

//–> was  filed  as  demonstrated  in the examples above. De Waal is a featured
celebrity  of  pro Khartoum regime Sudan Media Center, where his arguments in  opposition  of  ICC  are echoed in that platform over and over for the amazement of the regime in Khartoum and its supporters.

As  for De Waal complaints for being questioned on his motive for alerting
al-Bashir  prior  to  the  ICC  prosecutor  filing the application for the
arrest  warrant,  it  is  up to De Waal to explain his motives and for the
general public to interpret or even speculate on those motives.

Well,  the  last  time  I  checked  De  Waal’s  blog, Eric Reeve, the lone
respondent  whom  De Waal picked-on and allowed to comment on his article, is  being  pounded  by  the  supporters  of  the regime in Khartoum. Those supporters   of   the  regime  in  Khartoum  are  allowed  to  post  their
commentaries  at  the expense of those who disagree with De Waal. The most
shocking twist of events is that De Waal had no choice, but to forward his
article  to  be  published  in  Sudan Tribune as a counteraction to my own
article.  I hope this is not “counteraction on the cheap.” This is ironic,
because  De  Waal  could  privately threaten to deny me access to a public
platform  he controls while he would sneak around to go after me in search
of  another  public platform that I thrive on. After all, De Waal does not
control  public  platform at least that is what he found out. Now with his
<!–
D([“mb”,”\n\u0026nbsp;article, \u0026nbsp;which \u0026nbsp;he \u0026nbsp;denied \u0026nbsp;me \u0026nbsp;to \u0026nbsp;comment on already published in Sudan\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;Tribune, \u0026nbsp;I am in a liberty to comment on it as much as I want, but out of\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;respect, \u0026nbsp;I am not going to. I leave it for those who agree with him to do\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;the commentaries.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;If there is any lesson learned, it will be that my article affects De Waal\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;negatively and exposes his contradicting positions on the ongoing conflict\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;in \u0026nbsp;Darfur, \u0026nbsp;though \u0026nbsp;it \u0026nbsp;is difficult for him to openly admit the obvious.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;Another \u0026nbsp;lesson \u0026nbsp;learn \u0026nbsp;is \u0026nbsp;that \u0026nbsp;knowledge \u0026nbsp;is \u0026nbsp;independent of any single\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;individual \u0026nbsp;regardless of their race, region, class or what have you—there\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;is \u0026nbsp;no one in charge of monopolizing knowledge—no matter how many times he\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;or \u0026nbsp;she \u0026nbsp;is called “expert.” The search for truth, which is independent of\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;any individual human being or a race, is left to all. The good thing about\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;the truth is that it will always prevail in the end and set one free. With\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u0026nbsp;that, this must be the lesson of today.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\nCopyright © 2003-2008 SudanTribune – All rights reserved.\u003cbr /\u003e\n–~–~———~–~—-~——\u003cwbr /\u003e——~——-~–~—-~\u003cbr /\u003e\nYou received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups \u0026quot;JFD info\u0026quot; group.\u003cbr /\u003e\nTo post to this group, send email to \u003ca onclick\u003d\”return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)\” href\u003d\”mailto:jfdinfo@googlegroups.com\”\u003ejfdinfo@googlegroups.com\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\nTo unsubscribe from this group, send email to \u003ca onclick\u003d\”return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)\” href\u003d\”mailto:jfdinfo%2Bunsubscribe@googlegroups.com\”\u003ejfdinfo+unsubscribe@\u003cwbr /\u003egooglegroups.com\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\nFor more options, visit this group at \u003ca onclick\u003d\”return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)\” href\u003d\”http://groups.google.com/group/jfdinfo?hl\u003den\” target\u003d_blank\u003ehttp://groups.google.com/\u003cwbr /\u003egroup/jfdinfo?hl\u003den\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\n-~———-~—-~—-~—-~–\u003cwbr /\u003e—-~—-~——~–~—\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e”,0]
);

//–> article,  which  he  denied  me  to  comment on already published in Sudan
Tribune,  I am in a liberty to comment on it as much as I want, but out of
respect,  I am not going to. I leave it for those who agree with him to do
the commentaries.

If there is any lesson learned, it will be that my article affects De Waal
negatively and exposes his contradicting positions on the ongoing conflict
in  Darfur,  though  it  is difficult for him to openly admit the obvious.
Another  lesson  learn  is  that  knowledge  is  independent of any single
individual  regardless of their race, region, class or what have you—there
is  no one in charge of monopolizing knowledge—no matter how many times he or  she  is called “expert.” The search for truth, which is independent of
any individual human being or a race, is left to all. The good thing about
the truth is that it will always prevail in the end and set one free. With
that, this must be the lesson of today.

Advertisements

Written by torit1955

March 27, 2009 at 8:43 am

Fact Finding Report About Attack On Murle People

leave a comment »

The atrocious attack by the Nuer on 5-12 March on Murle people of Pibor County, Jonglei State which resulted to the death of 750 people, is now known to have occurred with full knowledge of the Commander of the 8th Divion of SPLA force, Gen Bol Koang, a Nuer. A number of Nuer army and police officers were among the attackers and bodied of officers and men in uniforms were identified among the attackers who were killed.

Read

20th/March/2009

H. E Dr. Riek Machar Teny Dhorgon

Vice president of Government of Southern Sudan

Subject:- Fact Finding Committee Report on the 8th. March.2009 Lou Nuer Attack on Likwangole Payam in Pibor County .

The Committee arrived on a chartered plane from Juba to Pibor at around 3:00 Pm on

15th. March. 2009

Day 1 Sunday 15th.March.2009 Pibor County

Upon arrival the Committee proceeded to the commissioner’s resident and held a meeting with the County Security Committee under the chairmanship of the County Commissioner . <!–
D([“mb”,”\u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eDuring the meeting the Committee listened to the security committee report on the Lou Nuer attack which started from Nanam on 6\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e.March 2009 and pushed its way to Likwangole Payam occupying it on 8\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e.March.2009\nburning the SPLM Flags and destroying hospital, Schools, shopping\ncentre, Payam administration offices and looting Copi and MSF\ncompounds. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eThe\nLou Nuer invaders captured Likwangole Payam killing one official and\ntown chief; While SPLA Battalion deployed to protect and defend\nLikwangole Payam remained in their barrack without any attempt of\ndefending the Payam. When the Payam executive director requested a\nforce to defend the Payam, the commanding officer of Battalion 358 of\nbrigade 47 in Division 8 Col. Juma Kadai Korok told executive officer\nthat they were ordered not to get involved in the tribal fighting and\nthat they should not defend Likwangole. The orders were given to them\nby SPLA Division 8 commander Maj. Gen. Bol Kong. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eOn 9\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e.March.2009,\na group of 45 attackers reported to the garrison, when reported to\ndivision 8 commanders Maj. Gen. Bol Kong, he issued orders to the\nbattalion commander to provide a protection to this group of Lou Nuer\nattackers and that they should not be beaten even. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cu\u003e\u003cspan style\u003d\”font-size:14pt\”\u003eDay 2 Monday, 16\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e.March.2009  Likwangole Payam\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\”\u003e \u003c/font\u003e\u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eThe\ncommittee arrived to Likwangole at 10:30 am and proceeded to the first\nresistant line of Likwangole Payam at water pump which is to the south\nwest Likwangole air strip. At the scene, the Committee found on the\nground some rotten bodies of 27 from Lou Nuer attackers and 5 bodies\nfrom the Murle including one small girl and a baby boy who were beaten\nto death by sticks. “,1]
);

//–>

During the meeting the Committee listened to the security committee report on the Lou Nuer attack which started from Nanam on 6th.March 2009 and pushed its way to Likwangole Payam occupying it on 8th.March.2009 burning the SPLM Flags and destroying hospital, Schools, shopping centre, Payam administration offices and looting Copi and MSF compounds.

The Lou Nuer invaders captured Likwangole Payam killing one official and town chief; While SPLA Battalion deployed to protect and defend Likwangole Payam remained in their barrack without any attempt of defending the Payam. When the Payam executive director requested a force to defend the Payam, the commanding officer of Battalion 358 of brigade 47 in Division 8 Col. Juma Kadai Korok told executive officer that they were ordered not to get involved in the tribal fighting and that they should not defend Likwangole. The orders were given to them by SPLA Division 8 commander Maj. Gen. Bol Kong.

On 9th.March.2009, a group of 45 attackers reported to the garrison, when reported to division 8 commanders Maj. Gen. Bol Kong, he issued orders to the battalion commander to provide a protection to this group of Lou Nuer attackers and that they should not be beaten even.

Day 2 Monday, 16th.March.2009  Likwangole Payam

The committee arrived to Likwangole at 10:30 am and proceeded to the first resistant line of Likwangole Payam at water pump which is to the south west Likwangole air strip. At the scene, the Committee found on the ground some rotten bodies of 27 from Lou Nuer attackers and 5 bodies from the Murle including one small girl and a baby boy who were beaten to death by sticks. <!–
D([“mb”,”\u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eThe committee then proceeded to Likwangole Payam military barrack and held a quick meeting with the officers. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eThe\ncommander of Battalion 358 Col. Juma Kadai Korok has been asked as to\nwhy he did not defended Likwangole Payam and its People? \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e Col.\nJuma Kadai Korok replied saying that his division commander Maj. Gen.\nBol Kong issued orders that the force should not get involved in the\ntribal fighting and must not get out from the barrack. But when the Lou\nNuer attackers surrendered to the army in the barrack the division\ncommander ordered me to give protection to the surrendering Lou Nuer\nattackers group of 45 people, which I did. Among the 45 people there is\na woman. Of the 45 people from Lou Nuer attackers, one passed away and\n4 were evacuated to Juba for medical treatment remaining 40 people in\nthe barrack. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eAfter\nhaving meeting with the officers at the barrack the committee visited\nthe surrendering Lou Nuer attackers and from there the committee\nreturned to Likwangole Payam head quarters accompanied by Jonglei state\nsecurity committee headed by H.E peace advisor for Jonglei state Mr.\nJohn Jok and a team of UNMIS led by the UNMIS head officer in the state\nMr. At Payam head quarters, the committee held a joint meeting which\ninclude representatives of UNMIS, Jonglei security committee, UNICEF\nrepresentatives on one side and the executive director with head chief\nof Likwangole Payam on the other. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eDuring\nthe meeting the committee listened to Payam executive director who\nreported that the Lou Nuer attack started on 12/February/2009 on\nMamchilil grassing area which continued for two consecutive days,\nWomen, children and elderly were killed and some children and women\nwere taken by the attackers. The number of cows stolen on 12″,1]
);

//–>

The committee then proceeded to Likwangole Payam military barrack and held a quick meeting with the officers.

The commander of Battalion 358 Col. Juma Kadai Korok has been asked as to why he did not defended Likwangole Payam and its People?

Col. Juma Kadai Korok replied saying that his division commander Maj. Gen. Bol Kong issued orders that the force should not get involved in the tribal fighting and must not get out from the barrack. But when the Lou Nuer attackers surrendered to the army in the barrack the division commander ordered me to give protection to the surrendering Lou Nuer attackers group of 45 people, which I did. Among the 45 people there is a woman. Of the 45 people from Lou Nuer attackers, one passed away and 4 were evacuated to Juba for medical treatment remaining 40 people in the barrack.

After having meeting with the officers at the barrack the committee visited the surrendering Lou Nuer attackers and from there the committee returned to Likwangole Payam head quarters accompanied by Jonglei state security committee headed by H.E peace advisor for Jonglei state Mr. John Jok and a team of UNMIS led by the UNMIS head officer in the state Mr. At Payam head quarters, the committee held a joint meeting which include representatives of UNMIS, Jonglei security committee, UNICEF representatives on one side and the executive director with head chief of Likwangole Payam on the other.

During the meeting the committee listened to Payam executive director who reported that the Lou Nuer attack started on 12/February/2009 on Mamchilil grassing area which continued for two consecutive days, Women, children and elderly were killed and some children and women were taken by the attackers. The number of cows stolen on 12<!–
D([“mb”,”\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e/Febuarary/2009\nattack were208, 108 head of cattle.  These cattle\u0026#39;s are stolen from two\nBomas of Kongor and Monchak. Kongor lost 11,719 while Monchak lost\n196,461. This attack was seen as a retaliation action by Lou Nuer to\nthe attack carried earlier by Murle to their area ignoring the appeal\nby Pibor county commissioner of recovering their cows, and while the\nMurle also took their earlier attack as revenge to 31\u003csup\u003est\u003c/sup\u003e.7.2007attack on Nyergeny Boma in\n Likwangole Payam. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eSecond\nattacks started on the 5th.March.2009 when a Lou Nuer mobilized armed\ncivilians were reportedly moving from three Lou Nuer Counties of Akobo,\nWuror and Nyirol. .The Lou Nuer attackers took Murle by surprise on the\nsame day 5\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e.March.2009 on a swift attack on Ngoyith,Bichibich, Lopilab, Mawuo and Rang grassing areas. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eOn 8\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e.March.2009\nthe Lou Nuer attack extended to Lekereth village pushing their way to\nLikwangole Payam. In Lekereth the Lou Nuer attackers forced women and\nchildren who they capture in Nanam into luaks and burn them alive. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eOn 9\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e.March.2009\nthe Lou Nuer attacked and captured Likwangole Payam burning SPLM flag\nin the Payam and destroying all government installations in the Payam\nand looting hospital, schools and the compounds of humanitarian\norganization operating in the Payam namely; Copi and MSF. The attackers\ncontinued their occupation of Likwangole Payam to the following day. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eOn 10\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e.March.2009\nthe Lou Nuer proceeded to Nyarath chi Eezo in Kong-Kong River and\nattacked Murle there killing women, children, elderly and some youth\nand looting cattles which they assembled in Likwangole Payam before\nthey drive them to their land. “,1]
);

//–>th/Febuarary/2009 attack were208, 108 head of cattle.  These cattle’s are stolen from two Bomas of Kongor and Monchak. Kongor lost 11,719 while Monchak lost 196,461. This attack was seen as a retaliation action by Lou Nuer to the attack carried earlier by Murle to their area ignoring the appeal by Pibor county commissioner of recovering their cows, and while the Murle also took their earlier attack as revenge to 31st.7.2007attack on Nyergeny Boma in Likwangole Payam.

Second attacks started on the 5th.March.2009 when a Lou Nuer mobilized armed civilians were reportedly moving from three Lou Nuer Counties of Akobo, Wuror and Nyirol. .The Lou Nuer attackers took Murle by surprise on the same day 5th.March.2009 on a swift attack on Ngoyith,Bichibich, Lopilab, Mawuo and Rang grassing areas.

On 8th.March.2009 the Lou Nuer attack extended to Lekereth village pushing their way to Likwangole Payam. In Lekereth the Lou Nuer attackers forced women and children who they capture in Nanam into luaks and burn them alive.

On 9th.March.2009 the Lou Nuer attacked and captured Likwangole Payam burning SPLM flag in the Payam and destroying all government installations in the Payam and looting hospital, schools and the compounds of humanitarian organization operating in the Payam namely; Copi and MSF. The attackers continued their occupation of Likwangole Payam to the following day.

On 10th.March.2009 the Lou Nuer proceeded to Nyarath chi Eezo in Kong-Kong River and attacked Murle there killing women, children, elderly and some youth and looting cattles which they assembled in Likwangole Payam before they drive them to their land. <!–
D([“mb”,”\u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eDuring\nthe meeting Head Chief Mr. Abarchoch Lual of Likwangole Payam also\nspoke and said, Likwangole Payam was attacked and captured by Lou Nuer\nburning the SPLM Flag while SPLA forces in the area stood aside without\ndefending the Payam, SPLA forces also participated in the looting of\nthe Payam and they even protected the attackers while they were\nrefusing to protect us. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eThe\nattackers were in SPLA uniform and were coordinating their attack with\nthe Battalion who have directed them to the water pump in the airport\nand assured them of cooperation on their side. The evident is seen in\nthe fact that the attackers took all cows in side Likwangole Payam\nexcept those belonging to the Lou Nuer settlers and the army. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eIn\nthe light of the above facts, the head chief concluded that SPLA forces\nin the Payam are not deployed to protect the Payam and its People as a\nnational force, but they are there as tribal forces who identify\nthemselves with their tribes in any tribal conflict like this one. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eTherefore,\nthe head chief request SPLA command to withdraw these forces with their\ncommand immediately before they could take law into their hand and\nretaliate on these forces. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eAt\n3:45pm Jonglei state security committee and the UNMIS team returned to\nBor town on a UN helicopter and the fact finding committee returned to\nPibor on two hard top land cruisers. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cu\u003e\u003cspan style\u003d\”font-size:14pt\”\u003e\u003cfont face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eDay 3 Tuesday, 17\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e.March.2009,  Pibor County \u003c/font\u003e”,1]
);

//–>

During the meeting Head Chief Mr. Abarchoch Lual of Likwangole Payam also spoke and said, Likwangole Payam was attacked and captured by Lou Nuer burning the SPLM Flag while SPLA forces in the area stood aside without defending the Payam, SPLA forces also participated in the looting of the Payam and they even protected the attackers while they were refusing to protect us.

The attackers were in SPLA uniform and were coordinating their attack with the Battalion who have directed them to the water pump in the airport and assured them of cooperation on their side. The evident is seen in the fact that the attackers took all cows in side Likwangole Payam except those belonging to the Lou Nuer settlers and the army.

In the light of the above facts, the head chief concluded that SPLA forces in the Payam are not deployed to protect the Payam and its People as a national force, but they are there as tribal forces who identify themselves with their tribes in any tribal conflict like this one.

Therefore, the head chief request SPLA command to withdraw these forces with their command immediately before they could take law into their hand and retaliate on these forces.

At 3:45pm Jonglei state security committee and the UNMIS team returned to Bor town on a UN helicopter and the fact finding committee returned to Pibor on two hard top land cruisers.

Day 3 Tuesday, 17th.March.2009,  Pibor County <!–
D([“mb”,”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/b\u003e \n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eThe\nfact finding committee held a joint meeting with the commissioner,\ncounty security committee and the chiefs of Pibor county comprise of 41\nchiefs, 10 from Pibor Payam,  10 from Gurumuk Payam, 10 from Likwangole\nPayam, 10 from Vertet Payam and 1 chief representing 10 chiefs OF Boma\nPayam. The 41 chiefs in the meeting expressed the below points as\nfollows; \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e1. \nThat the Jonglei state government ordered peaceful disarmament in Pibor\nand in the areas of neighboring communities, but disarmament was\nexecuted in Pibor only and now when attacked by the Lou Nuer the state\ngovernment  failed to protect us. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e2.\nOur people were killed in hospital in Bor town, and the state\ngovernment failed to investigate the case, but instead, it protected\nthe murderers. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e3.\nThe state government deployed Lou Nuer organized SPLA forces who have\nnow identified themselves with their tribe in our area, this force is\nnot representing the face of Southern Sudan as a result they turned\ntheir guns against Murle. Given this fact these forces must be\ntransferred and be replaced with nationally represented SPLA forces. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eThe\nchiefs expressed that Jonglei state cannot represent them and they must\nbe removed from Jonglei state and be put under GoSS supervision. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eIn\nthe end of the meeting the intellectuals, the chiefs and the\ncommissioner called for peaceful coexistence with the neighbors. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e”,1]
);

//–>

The fact finding committee held a joint meeting with the commissioner, county security committee and the chiefs of Pibor county comprise of 41 chiefs, 10 from Pibor Payam,  10 from Gurumuk Payam, 10 from Likwangole Payam, 10 from Vertet Payam and 1 chief representing 10 chiefs OF Boma Payam. The 41 chiefs in the meeting expressed the below points as follows;

1.  That the Jonglei state government ordered peaceful disarmament in Pibor and in the areas of neighboring communities, but disarmament was executed in Pibor only and now when attacked by the Lou Nuer the state government  failed to protect us.

2. Our people were killed in hospital in Bor town, and the state government failed to investigate the case, but instead, it protected the murderers.

3. The state government deployed Lou Nuer organized SPLA forces who have now identified themselves with their tribe in our area, this force is not representing the face of Southern Sudan as a result they turned their guns against Murle. Given this fact these forces must be transferred and be replaced with nationally represented SPLA forces.

The chiefs expressed that Jonglei state cannot represent them and they must be removed from Jonglei state and be put under GoSS supervision.

In the end of the meeting the intellectuals, the chiefs and the commissioner called for peaceful coexistence with the neighbors.

<!–
D([“mb”,”\u003cb\u003e\u003cu\u003e\u003cspan style\u003d\”font-size:14pt\”\u003eDay 4 Wednesday 18\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e.March.2009, Pibor County\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\”\u003e \u003c/font\u003e\u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eThe\nfacts finding committee accompanied by the county security committee\nled by the commissioner held a consultative meeting with the officers\nof Battalion 359 at the army barrack. Col. Peter Ruei the Commander of\nBattalion 359 of brigade 47, division 8 explained that the Lou Nuer\nattacks information came to them from Juba , therefore, the devastation\nwhich rocked Likwangole Payam came with the knowledge of the divisional\ncommander. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eCol.\nPeter Ruei reported that his command issued standing orders that when\nthe Lou Nuer attack begins the army must not intervene. He said that\nthe Lou Nuer from three counties mobilized themselves to attack\nLikwangole Payam, Gurumuk Payam and Pibor county head quarters as\nbriefed by our command. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eCol.\nPeter Ruei said his Battalion are all from Lou Nuer except a few who\ncome from Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile states, according to him this\nforce does not reflect the true face SPLA and hence , he recommends\ntransfer of all officers from sons of Jonglei state from this force. He\nmainly recommends transfer of officers from Lou Nuer who forms the\nmajority of the officers in this Battalion. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eMaj.\nSimon Dak Kier; stated that when they were organized in Bor to come to\nPibor, the message given was that we are going to fight with Murle\nbefore even reaching Pibor, but when we moved from Bor to Pibor we\nnever met any hostile behavior until we reached Pibor peacefully and\nfound that the people here are peaceful and friendly, contrary to the\ninformation of violence and hatreds as we were told by our command.\nMost of these forces are from Akobo County . “,1]
);

//–>Day 4 Wednesday 18th.March.2009, Pibor County

The facts finding committee accompanied by the county security committee led by the commissioner held a consultative meeting with the officers of Battalion 359 at the army barrack. Col. Peter Ruei the Commander of Battalion 359 of brigade 47, division 8 explained that the Lou Nuer attacks information came to them from Juba , therefore, the devastation which rocked Likwangole Payam came with the knowledge of the divisional commander.

Col. Peter Ruei reported that his command issued standing orders that when the Lou Nuer attack begins the army must not intervene. He said that the Lou Nuer from three counties mobilized themselves to attack Likwangole Payam, Gurumuk Payam and Pibor county head quarters as briefed by our command.

Col. Peter Ruei said his Battalion are all from Lou Nuer except a few who come from Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile states, according to him this force does not reflect the true face SPLA and hence , he recommends transfer of all officers from sons of Jonglei state from this force. He mainly recommends transfer of officers from Lou Nuer who forms the majority of the officers in this Battalion.

Maj. Simon Dak Kier; stated that when they were organized in Bor to come to Pibor, the message given was that we are going to fight with Murle before even reaching Pibor, but when we moved from Bor to Pibor we never met any hostile behavior until we reached Pibor peacefully and found that the people here are peaceful and friendly, contrary to the information of violence and hatreds as we were told by our command. Most of these forces are from Akobo County . <!–
D([“mb”,”\u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eAccording\nto Maj. Simon Dak Kier this formation encourages tribalism therefore;\nbattalion 359 and its command must be transferred and be thoroughly\nmixed with SPLA forces from sons of other areas before they are\ndeployed in any area. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eCpl. Nasser Akol recommends the following; \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e1. All officers from Jonglei state in this battalion should be transferred \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e2. All traders from Jonglei state coming in and out of Pibor County should be handled by the civilian police. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e3. Bor – Pibor road must be patrolled and cars must be provided with security escort from Bor to Ayidi and vice versa. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style\u003d\”font-size:14pt\”\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\”\u003e \u003c/font\u003e\u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cu\u003e\u003cspan style\u003d\”font-size:14pt\”\u003e\u003cfont face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eDay 5 Thursday 19\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e.March.2009, Pibor County \u003c/font\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/b\u003e \n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eThe\nfacts finding committee finished its facts finding mission and\nrequested a plane to return to Juba, however, the plane could not come\ndue to lack of funds to be paid to the flight company, as a result, the\nfacts finding committee has to spend one day in Pibor as a wasted time.\nBefore leaving Pibor County on above date Lou Nuer new group was\nreportedly moving towards Murle land again, and the committee returned\nback to Juba on 20\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e. 3 .2009 arriving Juba at 10:45 am. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e”,1]
);

//–>

According to Maj. Simon Dak Kier this formation encourages tribalism therefore; battalion 359 and its command must be transferred and be thoroughly mixed with SPLA forces from sons of other areas before they are deployed in any area.

Cpl. Nasser Akol recommends the following;

1. All officers from Jonglei state in this battalion should be transferred

2. All traders from Jonglei state coming in and out of Pibor County should be handled by the civilian police.

3. Bor – Pibor road must be patrolled and cars must be provided with security escort from Bor to Ayidi and vice versa.

Day 5 Thursday 19th.March.2009, Pibor County

The facts finding committee finished its facts finding mission and requested a plane to return to Juba, however, the plane could not come due to lack of funds to be paid to the flight company, as a result, the facts finding committee has to spend one day in Pibor as a wasted time. Before leaving Pibor County on above date Lou Nuer new group was reportedly moving towards Murle land again, and the committee returned back to Juba on 20th. 3 .2009 arriving Juba at 10:45 am.

<!–
D([“mb”,”\u003cfont face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cu\u003e\u003cspan style\u003d\”font-size:14pt\”\u003eDay 6 Friday 20\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e. March.2009 Juba, Southern Sudan\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\”\u003e \u003c/font\u003e\u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cu\u003e\u003cspan style\u003d\”font-size:14pt\”\u003eSummary of facts as reported on the ground.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\”\u003e \u003c/font\u003e\u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e1. \nThe field visit by the facts finding committee to the affected areas\nhas been successful and achieved its objectives, reaching all\ndestinations and met all chiefs of affected areas and the leadership of\nPibor County . \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e2.\nIt has been found that Lou Nuer attackers killed elderly, women and\nchildren in a manner of organized genocide or ethnic cleansing. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e3.\nSPLA forces deployed in Likwangole Payam did not defend the Payam in\nthe face of the Lou Nuer attack, instead, they defended the attackers\nand provided a protection to 45 Lou Nuer attackers, saying that they\nwere ordered by the division commander not to get involved in the\ntribal fighting, but at the same time the division commander issued\norders to protect the surrendering Lou Nuer attackers, who according to\ndivisional commander should not be touched and not even beaten. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e4.\nSPLA forces in Likwangole Payam participated in destruction of\nLikwangole Payam by looting the Payam after the withdrawal of the Lou\nNuer attackers. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e5.\nSPLA forces in Likwangole Payam buried three bodies of the attackers\nwho are believed to be SPLA officers killed during their attack on\nLikwangole Payam to cover evidence, bearing in mind that a Colonel and\na captain were killed from the Lou Nuer attackers. “,1]
);

//–>Day 6 Friday 20th. March.2009 Juba, Southern Sudan

Summary of facts as reported on the ground.

1.  The field visit by the facts finding committee to the affected areas has been successful and achieved its objectives, reaching all destinations and met all chiefs of affected areas and the leadership of Pibor County .

2. It has been found that Lou Nuer attackers killed elderly, women and children in a manner of organized genocide or ethnic cleansing.

3. SPLA forces deployed in Likwangole Payam did not defend the Payam in the face of the Lou Nuer attack, instead, they defended the attackers and provided a protection to 45 Lou Nuer attackers, saying that they were ordered by the division commander not to get involved in the tribal fighting, but at the same time the division commander issued orders to protect the surrendering Lou Nuer attackers, who according to divisional commander should not be touched and not even beaten.

4. SPLA forces in Likwangole Payam participated in destruction of Likwangole Payam by looting the Payam after the withdrawal of the Lou Nuer attackers.

5. SPLA forces in Likwangole Payam buried three bodies of the attackers who are believed to be SPLA officers killed during their attack on Likwangole Payam to cover evidence, bearing in mind that a Colonel and a captain were killed from the Lou Nuer attackers. <!–
D([“mb”,”\u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e6.\nNumber of 45 Lou Nuer attackers surrendered to Likwangole military\ngarrison including one woman, one of them passed away and 4 of them\nevacuated to Juba for medical treatment \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e7.\nJonglei state government sent food assistance and medical facilities to\nattacking Akobo County through Pibor County instead of rescuing the\naffected population in an attempt of provoking new round of violence. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e8.\nSome of the bodies of the attackers found on the ground were in SPLA\nuniform confirming participation of SPLA forces from Lou Nuer in this\nbarbaric attack on Likwangole Payam \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e9.\nIt is confirmed that three counties of Lou Nuer namely Nyirol, Wuror\nand Akobo have participated in the attack on Likwangole Payam as\nevidenced by the surrenders being citizens of these counties. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e10.\nThe number of Murle Killed in the latest Lou Nuer attack from Nanam\ndown to Likwangole, Kong-Kong and Jom are 453 and more than 100 people\nmissing according to primary reports. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e11. Number of the internally displaced persons are 6000 persons. \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e12. Among officers killed on their attack are; \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e- Col. Killed and his insignia brought to Pibor County Commissioner \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e- Lt.Col. Riel a Police officer killd”,1]
);

//–>

6. Number of 45 Lou Nuer attackers surrendered to Likwangole military garrison including one woman, one of them passed away and 4 of them evacuated to Juba for medical treatment

7. Jonglei state government sent food assistance and medical facilities to attacking Akobo County through Pibor County instead of rescuing the affected population in an attempt of provoking new round of violence.

8. Some of the bodies of the attackers found on the ground were in SPLA uniform confirming participation of SPLA forces from Lou Nuer in this barbaric attack on Likwangole Payam

9. It is confirmed that three counties of Lou Nuer namely Nyirol, Wuror and Akobo have participated in the attack on Likwangole Payam as evidenced by the surrenders being citizens of these counties.

10. The number of Murle Killed in the latest Lou Nuer attack from Nanam down to Likwangole, Kong-Kong and Jom are 453 and more than 100 people missing according to primary reports.

11. Number of the internally displaced persons are 6000 persons.

12. Among officers killed on their attack are;

– Col. Killed and his insignia brought to Pibor County Commissioner

– Lt.Col. Riel a Police officer killd<!–
D([“mb”,”\u003c/font\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e \n-Joseph Lual Chol, student in Kitale Killed\u003cspan dir\u003d\”rtl\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”rtl\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”rtl\” lang\u003d\”AR-EG\”\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”rtl\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”rtl\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e          \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”ltr\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”ltr\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”ltr\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”ltr\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e           \u003cspan dir\u003d\”rtl\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”rtl\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”rtl\” lang\u003d\”AR-EG\”\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”rtl\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”rtl\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e     \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”ltr\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”ltr\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”ltr\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”ltr\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\”\u003e\u003cfont face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e  -Lt. Deang Goi Yuod SPLA officer\u003cspan dir\u003d\”rtl\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”rtl\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”rtl\” lang\u003d\”AR-EG\”\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”rtl\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”rtl\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e  \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/font\u003e\u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e13. Wounded officers from Lou Nuer attackers \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e-  1\u003csup\u003est\u003c/sup\u003e.Lt. Tier Duk Koryom Police officer wounded \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e -1\u003csup\u003est\u003c/sup\u003e.Lt. Char Pot Bol SPLA officer wounded \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e – Lt. Gatluak Duop SPLA officer wounded \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e  \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eRegards \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eNumber of the fact finding Committee were 36 members \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eHeaded by Hon. Philip Thabalang Lukayee     \u003cbr\u003e\u003c/font\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e”,1]
);

//–>

-Joseph Lual Chol, student in Kitale Killed

-Lt. Deang Goi Yuod SPLA officer

13. Wounded officers from Lou Nuer attackers

–  1st.Lt. Tier Duk Koryom Police officer wounded

-1st.Lt. Char Pot Bol SPLA officer wounded

– Lt. Gatluak Duop SPLA officer wounded

Regards

Number of the fact finding Committee were 36 members

Headed by Hon. Philip Thabalang Lukayee

<!–
D([“mb”,”\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/font\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e  ——————————\u003cWBR\u003e———————- \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003e  \u003c/font\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp dir\u003d\”ltr\” style\u003d\”direction:ltr;text-align:left\”\u003e\u003cfont size\u003d\”3\” face\u003d\”Times New Roman\”\u003eC C.  President of Government of Southern Sudan \u003c/font\u003e \n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cspan dir\u003d\”ltr\”\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\n\n\n\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \n\n \u003c/div\u003e \n\n \n \u003cdiv width\u003d\”1\” style\u003d\”color:white;clear:both\”\u003e__._,_.___\u003c/div\u003e\n\n \n \n \u003cdiv style\u003d\”clear:both;white-space:nowrap;color:#666;text-align:right\”\u003e\n \u003cspan style\u003d\”float:left;white-space:nowrap\”\u003e\n \u003ca href\u003d\”http://groups.yahoo.com/group/SPLM-Diaspora/message/87583;_ylc\u003dX3oDMTM3NTFqMTI0BF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzExMzUzMzI0BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTEzNzgxOARtc2dJZAM4NzU4MwRzZWMDZnRyBHNsawN2dHBjBHN0aW1lAzEyMzgwMTk4OTcEdHBjSWQDODc1ODM-\” target\u003d\”_blank\” onclick\u003d\”return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)\”\u003e\n Messages in this topic \u003c/a\u003e (\u003cspan style\u003d\”font-weight:bold\”\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e)\n \u003c/span\u003e\n \u003ca href\u003d\”http://groups.yahoo.com/group/SPLM-Diaspora/post;_ylc\u003dX3oDMTJyZXUxMW5qBF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzExMzUzMzI0BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTEzNzgxOARtc2dJZAM4NzU4MwRzZWMDZnRyBHNsawNycGx5BHN0aW1lAzEyMzgwMTk4OTc-?act\u003dreply\u0026amp;messageNum\u003d87583\” target\u003d\”_blank\” onclick\u003d\”return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)\”\u003e\n \u003cspan style\u003d\”font-weight:bold\”\u003e\n Reply \u003c/span\u003e (via web post)\n \u003c/a\u003e | \n \u003ca href\u003d\”http://groups.yahoo.com/group/SPLM-Diaspora/post;_ylc\u003dX3oDMTJmMWRzZWZoBF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzExMzUzMzI0BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTEzNzgxOARzZWMDZnRyBHNsawNudHBjBHN0aW1lAzEyMzgwMTk4OTc-\” style\u003d\”font-weight:bold\” target\u003d\”_blank\” onclick\u003d\”return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)\”\u003e\n Start a new topic \u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e \n \n \n \u003cdiv style\u003d\”padding-top:10px;font-family:Verdana;font-size:77%;margin:0\”\u003e”,1]
);

//–>

—————————————————-

C C.  President of Government of Southern Sudan

Written by torit1955

March 26, 2009 at 6:50 am

Posted in Security

The Hazy Path Forward in Sudan

leave a comment »

The Hazy Path Forward in Sudan

Sarah Washburne Middle East Report Online http://www.merip.org/mero/mero032409.html

March 24, 2009 (Sarah Washburne is a doctoral student at the University of Exeter. She contributed this article from Khartoum.) For another view on the ICC decision, see Khalid Mustafa Medani, “Wanted: Omar al-Bashir — and Peace in Sudan,” Middle East Report Online, March 5, 2009. On the day after the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, the wanted man addressed a pre-planned rally of thousands in front of the presidential palace in Khartoum. Bashir was defiant, denouncing the warrant as “neo-colonialism,” and praising his supporters in Martyrs’ Square as “grandsons of the mujahideen,” a reference to the participants in the Mahdiyya uprising against Anglo-Egyptian rule in 1885. The atmosphere was almost one of jubilation; one might have mistaken the crowds for soccer fans celebrating a win. As Bashir condemned the ICC and the West from the microphone, the protesters waved the Sudanese flag and held aloft pictures of Bashir, as well as posters depicting the face of Luis Moreno Ocampo, the ICC prosecutor, superimposed upon the body of a pig. There were sporadic outbreaks of drumming, dancing and singing. It is easy to dismiss the March 5 rally as just another show staged by an authoritarian regime. Yet smaller groups of protesters could be found throughout the streets of Khartoum. Roadside spectators shouted chants of support as the demonstrators passed by; cars plastered with Bashir posters zipped through the capital with horns honking. Indeed, the Bashir regime does have a strong, loyal base in the central region of the country, which is, after all, some 600 miles from the far western province of Darfur, where the crimes against humanity and war crimes that the president is accused of orchestrating have taken place. Within days of the ICC’s announcement in The Hague, protests in Sudan had dwindled, in line, perhaps, with the official position of the government, as outlined by ‘Abd al-Rahman Ahmad Khalid Sharif of the Foreign Ministry, that they are “not concerned” by the warrant. Many analysts think that, if Bashir is held accountable to international law, some sort of change of leadership may take place in Sudan. The International Crisis Group, for instance, reports that in light of the “internal tensions within the regime, the indictment itself may provoke change.” Yet the question remains: Was the decision to indict a sitting head of state a wise one, and what effect will the decision have upon the future of Sudan? “Why Should We Worry?” The ICC has charged Bashir with five counts of crimes against humanity (“murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture and rape”) and two counts of war crimes (“intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities and pillaging”). The court concluded that there was not enough evidence to charge the president with genocide, as the violence inflicted upon the population of Darfur has sometimes been called. Moreover, the judges stated that it is the responsibility of the government of Sudan to turn Bashir over to the court. They also called upon all signatories to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC in 1998, and the United Nations, as well as those states that are not members (as Sudan is not), to aid in securing Bashir’s surrender. Realistically, it is far from certain that the Sudanese junta will give up its leader; countries in the Arab League and African Union, which vocally opposed the indictment, as well as China, may likewise be loath to cooperate. “Why should we worry about the ICC issue?” the Eritrean minister of information asked a curious reporter on the occasion of Bashir’s first trip abroad after the warrant was issued. On March 23, however, the Committee of Islamic Scholars, Sudan’s highest Muslim religious body, released a fatwa recommending that the president not travel to Qatar for the Arab summit to be held at the end of the month. Should Bashir remain at large, the case would be remanded to the UN Security Council, which could impose further sanctions and even authorize the use of force to apprehend him. Deadlock among the Council members, however, would preclude such measures. Given the unlikelihood of an actual arrest, what does the warrant actually achieve? Many long-time Darfur activists, such as the prominent actor George Clooney, have appeared on international news channels to say that the international community must look to the possibility of an arrest in the future. This possibility in and of itself, he says, will deliver some justice to the people of Darfur. But while the legal aspects of the case may be debated for years to come, the immediate political ramifications are undoubtedly of more importance. The ICC, of course, is a judicial institution that should not be swayed by political considerations. But once the court decided to prosecute a sitting head of state, the entire situation turned political. It had to. The history of the Bashir regime, and the present state of affairs in Sudan, make it clear that the political outcome of this ruling can only be negative. Outcomes Likely and Unlikely Idealism aside, it should be assumed that the decision to prosecute Bashir was taken knowing full well that the result will not be an actual arrest of Bashir, at least not in the near future. The ruling sends one clear political message: that no one who commits war crimes, not even a sitting head of state, is immune from justice. Yet many Darfur activists would like to see other political consequences. Firstly, there is hope that the warrant will help to end the war in Darfur, even if there is not an arrest. Secondly, the warrant may encourage dissent against Bashir within Sudan, leading to his removal by internal or external forces. (Bashir accuses the ICC of plotting “regime change.”) Any immediate push to end the war in Darfur is unlikely, however. In the past, the Bashir regime has shown that it demands respect, not condemnation, in order to cooperate with the international community. In addition, the two main rebel groups in Darfur, the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Movement-Minnawi branch are now less likely to participate in meaningful peace talks. The Bashir regime, from its beginnings in 1989, has been characterized as a dictatorial Islamist junta, but it is also a pragmatic government influenced greatly by “symbolic politics.” When the regime has felt threatened, as in 1993 when it was placed on the US list of states that sponsor terrorism, it has backed into isolation. When given certain concessions, however, Khartoum is willing to engage the international community. The early years of the George W. Bush administration are a prime example. The Clinton years had culminated in the US bombing of the Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum in 1998. In the summer of 2001, the Bush administration showed signs of taking a different approach, aided by the 1999 “palace coup” in Khartoum that saw the ouster of the government’s key Islamist ideologue Hasan al-Turabi, who is said to have personally invited Osama bin Laden to live in Sudan in the mid-1990s. Then, the September 11, 2001 attacks occurred, and the two governments began cooperating in counter-terrorism matters. Though Sudan remains on the state sponsors of terrorism list, in 2007 the State Department called Sudan “a strong partner in the war on terror.” In the meantime, the Bush administration, under pressure from conservative Christians and the Congressional Black Caucus, pushed Khartoum and the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005. Whatever Bashir’s intentions, he did pull the junta out of isolation on this occasion, and, for the most part, the CPA has held. As the international media and human rights groups turned the spotlight on the Sudanese government for its actions in Darfur, the regime, feeling threatened, fell back into its old ways. There has been no coordinated international strategy for dealing with the Darfur crisis, as there was with southern Sudan starting. The West, and in particular the United States, has sent mixed signals about Darfur, which have in turn been overshadowed by immense pressures from non-state actors, namely NGOs and the media. The media’s preoccupation with Darfur, and the claim of genocide, was a nuisance for Bashir. It now appears to the regime, however, that human rights groups and the “Zionist” media have exacted their “revenge” through the justices in The Hague. Meanwhile, the arrest warrant has emboldened the Justice and Equality Movement, which sat down for talks in Qatar with interlocutors from Khartoum in mid-February. The talks were a tentative step in the right direction. The Justice and Equality Movement leader, Khalil Ibrahim, now takes a hard line. In a press release on the group’s website, Ibrahim is quoted as saying: “Bashir refuses to surrender? We’ll just go in and drag him out of his palace…. Any chance for a deal is over.” The other main Darfuri rebel movement, the Sudan Liberation Movement-Minnawi, signed the Darfur Peace Agreement with the government in 2006. The group’s leader, Minni Minnawi, now holds an official position as presidential adviser to Bashir, and on March 4 he said he remained committed to implementing the 2006 accord. On March 6, however, the movement issued a statement “strongly supporting” the ICC decision, and blaming Bashir’s National Congress Party for rendering Sudanese courts too anemic to adjudicate the Darfur charges themselves. Party spokesmen insist there is no contradiction, but theirs is a strange position. Sudanese rebel movements are unpredictable, and it may be the renewed fighting in Darfur that has led to their change of attitude. But the ICC warrant definitely affects the groups’ media strategy: They want to be seen as in line with the weight of international moral opinion. No matter the reason of the rebel factions, their relationships with Khartoum are quickly worsening pursuant to the indictment. A rapid change of government in Sudan is as unlikely as an early peace in Darfur. Public opinion in Khartoum is varied on the subject of the ICC decision. Informal conversations show that, in spite of general antipathy for Bashir’s party, many regard the warrant as a form of imperialism infringing upon national sovereignty. Others feel that the label of “neo-colonialism” promoted by the state-run media is a propaganda tool that clouds Bashir’s role in the country. Some voice the opinion that it is time for Bashir to go, not necessarily because of the ICC warrant, but because “20 years is enough.” Overall, since there are strict laws limiting freedoms of speech and assembly, the population is keeping mum and staying at home. Dissension within the government, in theory, is another path to an alternation of power. The National Congress Party dominates the current coalition government. Some Sudanese think that the party will kick Bashir out of the presidential palace, but decline to hand him over to the ICC, for the sake of their own survival in power. Bashir, however, maintains the firm support of the army, which has always been key to the rise and fall of Sudanese regimes. There are also opposition parties in the parliament and the cabinet; the first vice president, Salva Kiir, is a southerner from the SPLM. Officially, these parties are not supportive of the ICC decision. Certain fringe parties, such as the United Democratic Liberal Party, or more established, but weak ones such as the Communist Party or the Islamist People’s Congress Party, led by Turabi and said to be a key supporter of the Justice and Equality Movement, wholeheartedly support the decision. “Politically, we think he is culpable,” Turabi has said of Bashir. But these figures have no clout with the government. The oldest and best-established parties in the country — the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party — have been unable to present a united front. Publicly, party members have contradicted themselves, at times hailing the ICC decision and at other times saying that any judicial process should be internal. On paper, the Democratic Unionist Party is categorically against prosecution of a head of state by an international institution. The leader of the Umma Party, Sadiq al-Mahdi, head of the democratically elected government overthrown by Bashir and his fellow officers in 1989, was initially supportive of the ICC indictment. Al-Mahdi backed away from this position once the arrest warrant was issued, saying that foreign intervention was not justified. Mid-level members of the two parties hold differing views. No matter their view on the subject, however, there is a constant theme: Politicians from all backgrounds fear that Bashir will use his authoritarian powers to delay the elections tentatively set for July 2009, thus preventing the current march towards a return to democracy. The Southern Perspective The SPLM is in a precarious position. On the one hand, the SPLM fought what was, at the time, the world’s longest-running civil war against the central government. On the other hand, it is now the second-largest partner in the government in Khartoum. Many of the accusations made against Bashir about Darfur were also made during the war in the south; an estimated 2 million people died during the fighting. The mission of the SPLM has always been to bring about a “new Sudan,” one that embraces religious and cultural pluralism and creates a genuine democratic process in all of the country. While this goal was originally to be achieved by forcibly seizing the state, since the signing of the CPA, the SPLM has changed its tune. In its amended manifesto, the movement states, “Using all legitimate peaceful means at its disposal, the SPLM shall continue to its struggle to build a new socio-political order.” In the minds of the SPLM, this wording refers to change through elections, not a coup or outside intervention. In fact, the movement believes it will win the July presidential election, as long as the electoral process is free and fair. National and local legislative elections are to take place concurrently. One SPLM state minister says he is convinced that the party has support all over Sudan since the traditional parties are outdated and Bashir’s party is generally despised. Interviews with numerous members of the SPLM political secretariats in the southern towns of Bor, Wau and Juba reveal persistence in the goal of having a southerner as president of the entire country. Any disruption of the CPA, however, would jeopardize this dream. The peace between the north and south not only gave the SPLM autonomous control over southern Sudan, but it also gave the movement 28 percent of cabinet seats and the first vice presidency. All of the SPLM’s future aspirations rest on the full implementation of the CPA and the upcoming elections. A key factor here is a healthy and productive relationship between the National Congress Party and the SPLM. Publicly, therefore, the movement fully backs Bashir in the ICC matter. Their reasoning has less to do with dislike of foreign intervention than with fear that the peace process will be derailed. Salva Kiir, the SPLM chairman, headed a crisis committee to exert diplomatic efforts to defer the indictment. Lam Akol, foreign minister from 2005 to 2006 and leader of a dissident SPLM faction, also said that the movement should support Bashir because they are now partners in government. In an interview held days before the ICC decision, he outlined the SPLM’s logic: [The SPLM and NCP] are partners in the agreement. The agreement provided that the two must be partners in implementing the CPA…. But, of course, there are countries in the West that would want to use the SPLM as a lever to continue pursuing their policies against the National Congress. And I, as a person, do not like that because once we have signed an agreement, we have to see that agreement through…. Because this regime that we want to change now includes us. How do we absolve ourselves from this responsibility? Privately, however, many SPLM members are on the fence. They sympathize with Darfuris, and perhaps would like to see a change of government. Many SPLM members are especially upset at the expulsion of aid groups from Darfur. SPLM civil servants working in capital say they are reluctant to endorse the ICC decision because of the possible consequences for the peace agreement. Many are taking a wait-and-see attitude. If the arrest warrant is pursued and the CPA holds, then they will herald the arrest. If the CPA suffers, then they are against the ICC ruling. Other SPLM representatives and members are less hesitant. Edward Lino, the former administrator of the oil-rich southern province of Abyei, where Khartoum has been slow to cede autonomy, has said that Bashir must hand himself over or “commit suicide.” Others believe that there is no reason for the ICC move to affect the SPLM’s position in Khartoum since the court is after a single individual, not the entire government. In an interview, one official from the SPLM-Northern Sector said the movement “cannot support the ICC and cannot support Bashir,” simply because it has no dog in the fight. For many ordinary southerners, who after all were chief among the victims of the civil war, the warrant is a sign from God that Bashir will get what he deserves. There is a near universal support for the ICC ruling among southern Sudanese living in the south, excepting those few who are members of Bashir’s party. Unsettling Effects To review, it is unlikely that Bashir will be arrested; that the war will end; or that the regime will fall, either to external or internal foes. One begins to question if the indictment of Bashir is constructive. Negative outcomes of the ICC ruling are already a reality. Khartoum has revoked the operating license of 16 aid agencies, and foreign staff has been expelled from northern Sudan, putting at risk the welfare of thousands, if not millions, of Sudanese internally displaced by war. Naturally, these actions are themselves criminal under international humanitarian law, but they are a logical reaction to the threat that Khartoum perceives. For all its bellicose rhetoric, the regime is indeed worried about its own future. It deals with perceived threats by lashing out, and the aid groups are conveniently at hand. Longer-term effects are also likely to be unsettling. The anticipated July 2009 elections would be the first held in the country since 1986 and the first comprehensive elections ever in all of southern Sudan. The National Congress Party now fears, naturally, that a challenger might win the presidency. Sudan’s foreign policy might change thereafter; it is even conceivable to Bashir and his backers that a successor would sign the Rome Statute. As nerves fray in Khartoum, Bashir might preempt this eventuality by delaying the elections indefinitely. That step would imperil the CPA, which stipulates that elections must be held before a referendum on independence in southern Sudan in 2011. The government has promised that the arrest warrant will not affect the north-south agreement. In a country that is very unstable at the margins, however, anything is possible. Finally, and perhaps most detrimental to the long-term resolution of political conflicts in Sudan, the ICC decision gives Bashir an excuse to plunge his country back into the injurious isolation of the first decade of National Congress Party (then called the National Islamic Front) rule. During this decade, the government gave Osama bin Laden refuge; was allegedly involved in an assassination attempt upon Egyptian President Husni Mubarak during a visit to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and was the only African state to support Iraq when it invaded Kuwait. As it shrinks from engagement with the West, Khartoum is relying on traditional allies in the Arab and African regions, as well as China. These countries, however, are unlikely to be able to help Sudan solve its problems. Regional initiatives to end the war in the south, for example, were miserable failures. The Egyptian-Libyan initiative accomplished nothing. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, an African-sponsored peace process, was unsuccessful until the US gave it a push. Had the ICC accused the Sudanese president of war crimes in 2003 or 2004, it is unlikely that the negotiations with the SPLM would have been successful. Most likely, the war in southern Sudan would still be going on. The path forward the international community, now that Pandora’s box has been opened by the ICC decision, is hazy. Certainly, the Security Council could put the warrant on hold for a year pending political progress in Darfur or until the elections are held. As long as the accusatory rhetoric remains, however, the regime will continue to be defiant. If, on the other hand, the West chooses to accommodate the regime somehow, it will throw the legitimacy of the ICC into question. In other words, the international community, and specifically the West, must tread lightly. The discrepancy between moral responsibility and pragmatic diplomacy is significant. In order to produce imperative short-term benefits in Sudan, long-term objectives of prosecution of Bashir and changing the country’s leadership might have to be put aside.

Written by torit1955

March 25, 2009 at 4:03 pm

Posted in Uncategorized

Challenges of Nation-Building, and Democratization in Africa

leave a comment »

OPINIONS & COMMENTARIES
POLITICS | Omar Kalinge Nnyago
Challenges of nation-building, and democratisation in Africa

The first challenge is in the definition. There is no agreed definition of nation-building. A 2003 study by James Dobbins and others for the RAND Corporation defines nation-building as “the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy.

The term nation-building is often used simultaneously with state-building, democratisation, modernisation, political development, post-conflict reconstruction, and peace-building. While this definition centres around the building of democratic processes, many argue that the use of the military to bring about democracy may be inherently contradictory.

Whether nation-building can be imposed from outside is one of the central questions in this regard.
Nation-building as a normative concept therefore means different things to different people.

However, the latest conceptualisation is essentially that nation-building programmes are those in which dysfunctional or unstable or “failed states” or economies are given assistance in the development of governmental infrastructure, civil society, dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as economic assistance, in order to increase stability.

Democracy, on the other hand, is what W.B Gaille called some years ago, an “essentially contested concept”. He noted that “there are disputes, centred on such concepts which are perfectly genuine: which, although not resolvable by argument of any kind, are nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence. Democracy, as an idea and as a political reality, is always contested. Until now, the world is not universally agreed on what democracy is or what it should be. North Korea asserts that it is a democracy just as the United States.

In the current global context, most who advocate democratisation still do not recognise democracy as a contested concept.

As a result, they view people with different interpretations of democracy as perverse. Thus, they are open to the risks of underestimating the strength of the alternatives.

This is especially true of advocates of the styles of democracy found in western Europe and the United States, who believe themselves to be the true heirs to the only legitimate democratic tradition and thus view any other effort to create democracies as false and undemocratic ( Esposito, 1996).

Because democracy is a contested concept, it is important to understand the perception of democracy within different African communities. However, among the most representative definitions of democracy is one by Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Lipset. It says that democracy “denotes a system of government that meets three essential conditions: competition, participation and political liberties”.

Interestingly, the demand for increased popular political participation and empowerment takes place alongside another demand, that for recognition of special identities or authentic communities, which could be contradictory when trying to build strong states.

The African state must be strong to build more unity within society and to create legitimacy by providing security and other services. Yet, the political leadership does not have the resources to accomplish these tasks. In order to obtain them, it resorts to predatory practices or plays upon and exacerbates social tensions between groups in society- which only adds to these tensions and further erodes loyalties.

The weak state is thus caught in a vicious cycle. Everything it does to become strong actually perpetuates its weakness. Closely related to legitimacy is the personalisation of the state, a phenomenon Weber called Patrimonialism, in which the objective interests of the state are indistinguishable from the subjective interests of the ruler of the regime in power. Earlier, Mobutu and Moi and currently Bongo, Mugabe and Museveni are typical neo –Patrimonialistic identities.

Such leaders can only have a short-term political perspective because their security and their physical survival depends on the strategies they pursue for the moment. Consequently, it may be ‘rational’ for such regimes to adopt policies that, for example, utilise scarce resources for military equipment, and manpower and to perceive opposition groups demanding greater participation as security threats.

If democratisation aims at strengthening civil society, then it ought to threaten the leadership of a weak state. Civil society aid in the past fifteen or so years has been a central component of democratisation. But there are a few problems.

Many active civil society organisations have stayed or at least pretended to stay out of politics mainly for fear of state reprisal. So, they don’t contribute directly to democracy. Others, the elite kind most favoured by the donor community, those directly involved in promoting multiparty democracy often have weak roots in the community without a real social base.

It is also true that some of these NGOs cannot serve as agents of democratisation as some are internally undemocratic and are forced to be more responsive to donor than to any local constituencies.

Democratisation, unfortunately, remains a concept that can better be described than defined, leaving the door wide open to varying, often contradictory interpretations. More debate on democratisation may be necessary if the donors, civil society and African governments are to move in the same direction.

omarkalinge@gmail.com

Written by torit1955

March 24, 2009 at 12:33 pm

Posted in Opinions

South Sudan lawmakers pass anti-corruption act

with 2 comments

South Sudan lawmakers pass anti-corruption act
Tuesday 24 March 2009.

By Isaac Vuni

March  23,  2009 (JUBA) — The Anti-corruption Act today passed unanimously with  the  votes  of  eighty-nine lawmakers and the support of the cabinet minister of legal affairs and constitutional development, who is empowered to  implement  the  policy  of  zero-tolerance  for corruption declared by President Salva Kiir Mayardit in 2006.

Hon. Speaker James Wani Igga described the act as being second only to the
interim  constitution  of  Southern  Sudan  in  terms  of  priorities  and
emphasized the act would empower a commission of anti-corruption officials to  enter  any  government  institutions  without  prior notice to conduct investigations   on  government  officials  suspected  of  looting  public properties and funds.

Earlier,  Hon.  Jimmy  Wongo Miji (USAP, Morobo constituency), chairman of the  specialized  committee  on  public accounts, had urged legislators to
pass  the  bill  in  its third and final reading so that looters of public
fund  and  properties  can  be  legally apprehended by the anti-corruption
commission officials.

Meanwhile, Hon. Oliver Mori Benjamin challenged parliament to be exemplary to  other  institutions  by  not  condoning corruption, demanding that the assembly account including funds for chairpersons and deputies be audited.

“We  have  passed  many  vital  Acts  but  our  executive are reluctant in
implementing them; probably they assume themselves to be above lawmakers,”
remarked Hon. Martin Aligo.

Critics  note  there  is little to celebrate as the August House is at the
center  of promoting corruption. Hon. Sebit Abe said corruption is rampant
in  the  south  but  requires  serious  action  by the new anti-corruption
commission without nepotism or favouritism.

He  challenged party leaders to crosscheck performance of their MPs and
their  respective  contributions to debate in the assembly on vital topics
of national deliberation; otherwise, he warned, some MPs are only going to
earn huge salaries without properly presenting their people and parties.

Written by torit1955

March 24, 2009 at 8:55 am

Posted in Corruption

Omar Al Bashir: To Travel or Not to Travel

leave a comment »

Sunday 22 March 2009 05:00.

March 21, 2009 (KHARTOUM) — The highest Islamic authority in Sudan issued an opinion today saying that president Omer Hassan Al-Bashir should not travel to attend the annual Arab summit in Qatar this month.

The move came as senior Sudanese officials today left the door open for Bashir to cancel his scheduled appearance at the summit despite earlier assertions that he will attend.

On March 4th the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber I at the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese president Omer Hassan Al-Bashir on seven counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, which include murder, rape and torture.

Yesterday Reuters reported that the ICC’s prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo was in New York to urge countries to act on the ICC arrest warrant against Bashir.

“As soon as he travels through the international airspace he could be arrested. Slobodan Milosevic and Charles Taylor show that the destiny of Mr. Bashir is to face justice” he said.

“Two months or two years will depend on the state and how they act. But his destiny is to face justice” Ocampo asserted.

The pro-government Sudanese media center website published the findings of the board which has the power to issue Fatwas [religious opinions] and make the final say on any disputed topics from an Islamic perspective.

“This is an appeal and fatwa from the Islamic scholars board presided by its council and its general secretariat on the forbidding the president of the republic to attend the Arab summit in Qatar in light of the current circumstances where enemies of Allah and the nation are surrounding him” the statement read.

“Fearing for the sake to prevent danger is following orders of god and the prophet and forfeiting chances of the enemies of Allah by staying inside Sudan with your people and angering the infidels”.

The Sudanese president said in an interview with Egypt’s independent Al-Isboa weekly published Saturday that he will fly to Doha to attend the Arab summit for which he received an official invitation a week ago.

But today the presidential press secretary Mahjoub Badri told the pro-government Al-Rayaam that no final decision has been made on Bashir’s trip.

Government sources told the London based Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper that there is division within the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) on the issue.

The newspaper quoted the sources as saying that some officials say the trip as necessary to prove that Bashir is not affected by the ICC ruling while others believe it is not worth the risk.

The Sudanese defense minister Abdel-Rahim Mohamed Hussein said that discussions are still ongoing on Bashir’s travel and if agreed on will be surrounded by “security and military precautions”.

Sudan had previously announced that it is making special security arrangements for the travel of Bashir to Doha which reportedly includes fighter jets guarding the presidential plane.

Khartoum is particularly worried by prospects of foreign fighters intercepting Bashir’s plane and forcing to land in a country where he can be apprehended.

Sudan summoned the French ambassador this week over statements attributed to Eric Chevallier, spokesman of the French foreign ministry in which he suggested that his government will support any operation aimed at arresting the Sudanese president through intercepting the plane.

The French government said Chevallier’s was misquoted by the London based Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper which interviewed him.

This week the Sudanese former president Siwar Al-Dahab urged Bashir to exercise “patience and wisdom” and not risk travelling to Doha “for his safety and the safety of Sudanese people”.

Also Sudanese newspapers reported that a one day sit in is scheduled on Sunday by pro-Bashir supporters to ask for cancellation of appearance at Doha summit.

Written by torit1955

March 22, 2009 at 9:04 am

Posted in ICC and Darfur Crisis

Tagged with ,

Aid Expulsions Sparks Fears for Darfur Camps

leave a comment »

Aid expulsions spark fears for Darfur camps

Thu Mar 19, 2009 4:05pm GMT

By Andrew Heavens KHARTOUM (Reuters) –

Aid officials and diplomats on Thursday said there were fears of growing humanitarian crises in three Darfur refugee camps, after Sudan’s wanted president shut down 16 aid groups. Sudanese president Omar Hassan al-Bashir expelled 13 foreign aid organisations and closed three local groups this month, accusing them of helping the International Criminal Court issue an arrest warrant against him for alleged war crimes in Darfur. The groups deny working with the court. Aid officials told Reuters there was a risk of fresh disease outbreaks in south Darfur’s Kalma and Kass camps after residents refused to let state-backed aid agencies come in to replace the expelled humanitarian groups. The U.S. embassy in Khartoum released a statement saying it was “deeply concerned” by the situation in Zamzam camp in north Darfur, where the expulsions have coincided with an influx of 36,000 people fleeing recent fighting. The expulsions of groups including Oxfam, Save the Children and Care sparked international outrage. U.S. President Barack Obama on Wednesday warned the Sudanese government would be held accountable for every life lost as a result of the reduction of humanitarian cover. Sudanese government aid officials said the expelled groups’ work would be covered by surviving international organisations and scores of local groups that authorities were planning to bring into the area.

“TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT”

But Hussein Abu Sharati, who says he represents Darfuri refugees in 158 camps, said Kalma residents had met and voted to refuse all aid from Sudanese groups. “They don’t see these groups as aid organisations, they see them as tools of the government,” he told Reuters by satellite phone. “IDPs (internally displaced people) in Kalma and Kass are refusing all access to the government and local aid groups even if it means receiving less water or a greater risk of disease,” said an aid worker from one of the ousted organisations, speaking on condition of anonymity. The workers said residents had blocked all state deliveries of fuel for their own generators, set up to pump fresh water in to the camp, raising the risk of the spread of diseases like cholera.

Camp leaders were also refusing to let Ministry of Health officials vaccinate residents against a new meningitis outbreak, he added. Kalma and Kass are home to tens of thousands of people who fled their homes after raids and attacks by government troops and militias during the Darfur conflict. The U.S. embassy said there was a growing water and land shortage in North Darfur’s Zamzam camp after the arrival of 36,000 people fleeing clashes between rebels and government fighters. The shortage had been “exacerbated” by the expulsions, it said, urging Sudan’s government to work out a plan with the United Nations and surviving aid groups “before the humanitarian situation deteriorates any further”. International experts say almost six years of fighting has uprooted 2.7 million people. Many of the camps that have taken them in have become highly politicised.

A joint U.N./Sudan government assessment mission into the impact of the expulsions, which hit aid programmes across north Sudan, was due to return to Khartoum late on Thursday. Darfur’s joint U.N./African Union UNAMID peacekeeping force has said it is ready to do what it can to fill any humanitarian gaps left by the expulsions. Aid workers have been concerned about suggestions the peacekeepers might take on humanitarian work in Sudan. “Gradually the line between peacekeepers and aid workers gets blurred and then everyone becomes a fair target,” said one. Armed men attacked an UNAMID patrol in South Darfur this week, killing one Nigerian peacekeeper. Five workers for the Belgian arm of Medecins Sans Frontieres were kidnapped in North Darfur last week and held for three days by a group that, government officials said, was protesting against the International Criminal Court

Written by torit1955

March 20, 2009 at 9:13 am

Posted in Uncategorized